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The Shrinking Center: When Are Centrists More Effective Lawmakers? 
 
 Barack Obama’s signature promise in the 2008 presidential election campaign was to enact 
healthcare reform, and, upon taking office, it was among his earliest major legislative priorities. In 
January 2009 – the beginning of the 111th session of the United States Congress – Democrats held a 
256-178 seat advantage in the House of Representatives and a 57-41 seat advantage in the Senate. 
Ostensibly, Democrats had the margins to pass sweeping legislation at least in the House, but a 
resolute group of centrist Democrats known as the Blue Dogs stood in the way. As Rubin (2017) 
describes the centrist intraparty organization’s influence, “So long as the Blue Dogs could respect 
the results of the organization’s voting procedures and maintain unity, the Coalition could continue 
to hold the upper hand in negotiations with party leaders,” (Rubin 2017, 217). Indeed, the ardent 
advocacy of the Blue Dogs and their moderate Senate counterparts was chronicled throughout the 
media, and, ultimately, Democratic leaders had no choice but to acquiesce to many of the centrists’ 
fiscal concerns in the final bill such as elimination of the so-called “public option,” (Rubin 2017, 
216-22; Dennis 2009; Lothian 2009).  
The parties’ roles were switched when Republicans took their own shot at healthcare reform 
in 2017 and the moderate Republican Tuesday Group stalled the party’s efforts to repeal the 
Affordable Care Act (Kane 2017). Yet, moderates have also shown a capacity to break through 
gridlock; in January 2018, an ad hoc “Common Sense Coalition” met in Senator Susan Collins’ (R-
ME) office and, using a talking stick to limit one person to talking at a time, the group forged a 
consensus to end a government shutdown (Ellefson 2018). 
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Media coverage and public consciousness of the increasing polarization and endemic 
gridlock in the U.S. Congress has become ubiquitous in recent years, and, in each of the last several 
election cycles, retiring moderates have made their rounds to bemoan Congress’s lack of ability to 
forge consensus and work across the aisle (see, for example, Tomasky 2017; Helderman 2012; and 
Preston et al. 2010). Yet, amid this polarization, a plurality of Americans consistently identifies 
themselves as moderates – with only three exceptions from 1972 until 2010, exit polls in each 
biennial election showed that more Americans identified as moderates than either liberals or 
conservatives – and books such as The Radical Center (2001) and advocacy organizations such as 
No Labels have emerged to promote centrist ideas and candidates (Best and Krueger 2012). With 
Congress’s approval rating failing to top 20 percent over the past eight years in the Gallup poll as 
Americans continue to express frustration over the body’s inability to pass legislation, one might 
assume that moderates matter more than ever in forging compromise and passing legislation (Brenan 
2017). Volden and Wiseman (2011) developed an index – the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) 
– that sheds light on how to evaluate whether legislators are effective based on how many bills they 
advance through the legislative process. Using that tool, this paper will explore under what 
conditions moderates are, in fact, effective lawmakers. 
Legislative Effectiveness 
What makes an effective legislator? That question has consumed significant, though not 
exhaustive, scholarly attention as far back as Davidson (1970), who aimed to define what attributes 
effective legislators share. He suggested that, despite each legislator having different goals, any 
measure of success must include writing and passing of legislation. Frantzich (1979) builds on this 
work and measures success quantitatively through the number of bills passed in the 94th Congress, 
finding that although ideologically moderate congressmen constitute an overrepresented group 
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among those he finds to be effective, as a whole, those congressmen who were successful in getting 
legislation passed actually saw a decrease in their electoral margins, suggesting that voters do not 
always reward legislative effectiveness (Frantzich 1979, 425). Volden and Wiseman (2011) aim to 
address the gap in scholarly literature for quantifying legislative effectiveness by developing the 
Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) as a “transparent and substantively plausible technique for 
measuring a legislator’s lawmaking effectiveness,” (Volden and Wiseman 2011, 238). Their score 
encompasses lawmakers’ success in five components of the legislative process and weights 
substantive and significant bills more heavily than ceremonial bills; the LES is the first numerical 
index to measure legislative effectiveness, and it provides abundant opportunities for ongoing 
exploration and application of the concept, which this paper endeavors to do. 
Despite the robust nature of LES, it does have limitations; while, conceptually, enacting 
legislation is a key component of effective lawmaking, surely the three examples of moderates 
influencing the legislative process mentioned in the introduction of this paper are also examples of 
successful exertion of political power to promote one’s policy agenda, yet, because, in those 
examples, moderates did not push legislation of their own, their efforts would not be encompassed 
in LES. Furthermore, securing federal money for one’s district is a feat in exertion of one’s influence 
towards a political end, which, again, may well meet a definition of legislative effectiveness but is 
not necessarily captured by LES. Moderates actually secure a seven percent increase in federal 
funding to their district for every one standard-deviation increase in their proximity to the ideological 
median of the House, Alexander, Berry, and Howell (2016) found, which supports the median voter 
theorem’s conclusion that, when considering a single issue whose voters follow a standard 
distribution, the equilibrium outcome corresponds to the median voter’s preference, making that the 
most desirable point (for an overview, see Chaturvedi 2017, 1251). Cox and McCubbins (2005) 
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expound on the median voter theory’s implications for those close to their party’s median in 
Congress by suggesting that negative agenda control – the ability to keep items off the agenda, 
typically exercised by the majority party – results in those bills that do make it on the agenda aligning 
with the preferences of those close to the party median. However, these party medians are 
increasingly polarized, so this finding suggests less about the overall effectiveness of centrists. 
Passing legislation, however, requires legislative organization, which, in the modern 
Congress, is typically manifested through political parties. Although party leaders tend to have the 
greatest potential for influence in the chamber, that influence depends to a considerable extent on 
institutional context (Cooper and Brady 1981; Fenno 1973). Without carrots and sticks, cajoling 
disparate intraparty factions has proven challenging for party leaders on both sides of the aisle (Kane 
2017; Dennis 2009). Former Speaker of the House John Boehner resigned in 2015 amid intraparty 
conflict spurred by the right-wing Freedom Caucus, a successor to the Tea Party that thrust 
Republicans to power in 2010 whose political positions Boehner found untenable (or, in many cases, 
non-existent) and thus struggled to wrangle especially after he ended one of party leaders’ 
historically best carrots to wrangle reluctant voters (earmarks) and was reluctant to use sticks such 
as committee reassignments (although he eventually did so in a few cases) (Alberta 2017).  
The struggles of recent legislative leaders notwithstanding, securing a post in the party 
leadership tends to be a boon for members of Congress seeking to build influence (Fenno 1973; 
Meinke 2016). In both parties, leadership organizations and whip structures have grown 
precipitously since the 1970s, particularly in the Democratic party, where centrism has, on occasion, 
been a positive predictor of membership in the whip structure as opposed to the GOP, where centrism 
has never been a positive predictor of holding a leadership position (Meinke 2016). Both parties have 
long used peripheral leadership positions as carrots to engender party loyalty (Meinke 2016, 42-46). 
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Traditional scholarship suggests that, when parties are divided, they tend to aim for more 
inclusiveness and representation in their leadership structure, but during times of homogeneity, they 
choose party loyalists (Meinke 2008). However, Heberlig and Larson (2012) show that the ability to 
fundraise is a key to advancing in a party’s leadership structure, particularly in tight election years. 
In fact, the ability and willingness to redistribute campaign funds to more vulnerable co-partisans 
may well be increasingly overshadowing other criteria such as party loyalty and racial and gender 
diversity as criteria for advancement (Heberlig and Larson 2007). This finding expands on their prior 
research, which shows that members of Congress select ideological extremists over ideological 
middlemen when the extremists distribute more money than the centrists (Heberlig, Hetherington, 
and Larson 2006). In sum, their research suggests that moderates are largely being shut out of party 
leadership positions, which ostensibly weighs down moderates’ potential to succeed in passing major 
legislation. 
Yet, even without presence in the party’s formal leadership, intraparty organizations such as 
the Blue Dogs, Tuesday Group, and Freedom Caucus have each proven effective in promulgating 
their respective agendas when they hold together sufficient capacity to stall the chamber, effectively 
organizing pivotal votes into a single bloc (Rubin 2013; 2017; Lucas and Deutchman 2009). 
Republican leaders have, however, been more willing to discipline recalcitrant moderates than 
extreme conservatives (Pearson 2015, 170). Furthermore, Republican leaders can often convince 
Tuesday Group members to fall in line more easily than Freedom Caucus members (Pearson 2015, 
49). On the Democratic side, despite the Blue Dogs’ desire (and success) in promulgating centrist 
policy priorities, Nancy Pelosi largely acquiesced or attenuated the concerns of Blue Dogs, bringing 
them under the party’s tent during her speakership during which she secured record-high party unity 
scores (Pearson 2015, 175). As such, Pearson concludes that moderate Democrats exercise greater 
Page 6 of 24 
 
influence in policy than moderate Republicans. Kirkland and Slapan (2017) conclude that 
ideologically extreme legislators are less loyal to their party when it is in the majority, while 
ideological moderates become more loyal when they transition to the majority, an assertion that 
aligns with the cases discussed elsewhere in this paper. 
Perhaps the most significant phenomenon in the study of moderates’ legislative effectiveness 
is their declining number. As the ideological gulf between the two parties continues to widen (as it 
has in nearly every election since the 1970s), the number of moderates in Congress has continued to 
decrease (Thomsen 2017, 1). Much research exists on polarization in Congress and the asymmetric 
nature thereof – namely, that Republicans have moved further right than Democrats have moved left 
– but, in many cases, the declining number of moderates in Congress is considered as an endogenous 
factor (on asymmetric polarization, see Grossman and Hopkins 2016). Thomsen, however, suggests 
that a cascading effect – particularly on the Republican side, where rank-and-file members who value 
doctrinal purity display more overt hostility towards their moderate co-partisans – wherein 
polarization begets more polarization has led to fewer traditionally-qualified moderate candidates 
running and more moderate legislators retiring irrespective of the electorate’s ideological tendencies 
(Thomsen 2017; Grossman and Hopkins 2016). Maestas et al. (2006) cites data showing that being 
an ideological moderate was a statistically significant deterrent to running for potential Republican 
candidates for the House of Representatives, while it was not statistically significant in either 
direction for Democrats. Thomsen asserts further that traditional explanations for why fewer 
moderates run – gerrymandered congressional districts, money in politics, and an ideologically 
extreme primary electorate – do not explain the dearth of candidates. Ansolabehere et al. (2010) 
show that primary elections do not significantly send legislators’ voting positions further to the poles 
even when the ideological composition of the primary electorate appears to be extreme; in other 
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words, legislators are growing more extreme even as the electorate is not. Furthermore, Bafumi and 
Herron (2010) show not only that members of Congress are more extreme than their constituents, 
but that when a legislator is replaced by a new member from the opposing party, the new member is 
also more extreme than the constituents, a concept they call “leapfrog extremism.” 
Potential moderate candidates do still exist in state legislatures, the primary feeding pool for 
the House of Representatives, but, evidently, they do not judge potential congressional service to be 
a fulfilling proposition (Thomsen 2017, 54). Even controlling for seat type, district partisanship, 
legislator experience, and ability to fundraise – and, as Kim (2011), shows, fundraising demands for 
moderates far exceed those for more ideologically extreme candidates – liberal Republicans and 
conservative Democrats “are much less likely to seek congressional office than those at the 
extremes,” (Thomsen 2017, 97). Furthermore, moderates are also retiring at a faster pace than 
extremists, and, through interviews, Thomsen finds that retired moderate legislators find life outside 
of Congress far more rewarding than their work was prior to their retirement (Thomsen 2017, 121). 
Each of these findings exacerbates the incumbency effect and results in Congress having fewer and 
fewer “senior moderates.” Ultimately, Thomsen introduces a concept she calls “party fit” to explain 
the dearth of moderates seeking and retaining office: essentially, moderates cease to fit in the modern 
political party duopoly.  
“The central hypothesis is that, in the current polarized context, the value of 
congressional office is too low for liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats to 
run. It has become increasingly difficult for ideological moderates to influence the 
policy agenda, advance within the body, and forge bonds with their co-partisans.” 
(Thomsen 2017, 35) 
 
That moderates find a decreasing value in holding office is significant for two reasons, 
Thomsen argues: it will exacerbate long-term polarization if parties do not have moderate anchors 
at the center, and, as legislation is increasingly developed to win support of a single party, legislators 
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at the chamber median can “neither credibly threaten to work with an increasingly distant and insular 
opposition party nor muster significant numbers to influence the direction of their own party” 
(Thomsen 2017, 50-52). Thus, partisan polarization is self-reinforcing insofar as the hollowing of 
the political center has discouraged ideological moderates from running for and remaining in 
Congress. 
Whether this affects the overall legislative effectiveness of those moderates remaining in 
Congress is an open question. As Thomsen compellingly argues, “[M]embers of Congress are part 
of a team that has a clear policy agenda and benefits of the office are distributed based on their 
adherence to this agenda” (Thomsen 2017, 35). In a theoretical sense, Volden, Wiseman, and 
Wittmer (2013) argue in a paper on when women are more effective legislators than men that certain 
institutional contexts such as contentious, partisan activities may help men outperform women when 
in the majority, but that women’s propensity to form coalitions and introduce new policies may help 
them outperform men when in the minority party. A similar finding seems plausible for centrists. 
So, When Are Centrists More Effective Lawmakers? 
Given rapid proliferation in congressional polarization, changes to the interbranch balance 
of power over the past several decades, evolving campaign finance laws, and expanding party 
leadership structures, identifying a singular answer to whether centrist legislators are more effective 
seems implausible. However, harnessing the time series data in Volden and Wiseman (2011) allows 
ample opportunity to make comparisons in legislative effectiveness across various institutional 
contexts, which Cooper and Brady (1981) identified as key to effective analysis of legislative power. 
Certainly, in the 1980s and 1990s, moderates in both parties found success when they worked 
as a bloc that forced the hand of party leaders to make concessions towards centrism (Thomsen 2017, 
36). For example, moderates such as Beverly Byron (D-MD) and Amo Houghton (R-NY) sat on 
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powerful committees and achieved legislative goals, but party lines then were far blurrier than they 
are today (Thomsen 2017, 27). Yet, moderates today lament an inability to foster interparty dialogue 
or affect their party’s agenda as the parties drift towards the poles, clearly making it harder to be 
effective (Thomsen 2017, 39). In spite of this polarization, I argue that attaining leadership roles and 
securing desirable committee assignments and positions remain key components of being an 
effective lawmaker. Further, I accept Volden’s and Wiseman’s conception of what makes an 
effective lawmaker as manifested in the LES, cognizant of its aforementioned limitations relevant to 
centrists, who may be more likely to exercise legislative power at veto points than to pass legislation, 
a question that is worth investigating, but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
As such, I hypothesize that, in a comparison of members of Congress, those who are centrists 
will be less effective than those who are not centrists, and that the difference in effectiveness between 
non-centrists and centrists increases over time. The independent variable under consideration is level 
of centrism as indicated by the legislators’ DW-NOMINATE score, the standard measure in the 
field, and the dependent variable is the legislators’ Legislative Effectiveness Score using Volden’s 
and Wiseman’s dataset. In testing the hypothesis, I will control for whether the legislator is in the 
majority or the minority, seniority, and race, each of which was a statistically significant factor in 
Volden’s and Wiseman’s analysis (2011, 252). Ultimately, in addition to presenting aggregate data, 
I will break down the data by session of Congress to identify trends such as whether, since the 
Republican takeover of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1994, after which lawmaking was 
consolidated to a much larger extent in the hands of the majority leadership and which many of the 
interviews in Thomsen’s book identify as the moment in which being a moderate was increasingly 
untenable, centrists have been less effective. I anticipate that the results before 1994, when moderates 
recall frequently being courted for their vote and having their concerns taken seriously, and after 
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1994, when – particularly on the Republican side – moderates bemoan overt hostility towards their 
beliefs may diverge; if that is the case, further analysis will be warranted to identify a causal 
explanation. 
Research Design 
Introduction 
In order to test these hypotheses, I examined data from the Legislative Effectiveness Score 
(LES) developed by Volden and Wiseman, which include data from 21 Congresses between 1971 
and 2014 with observations from each of the 9366 members during that time period. I selected these 
data because this index is the first significant attempt to quantify the effectiveness of legislators in 
fulfilling their primary constitutional responsibility, passing laws. As discussed earlier in this paper, 
LES has several constraints, the most obvious of which is that it conceptualizes lawmaking rather 
narrowly: being the primary sponsor of a bill that advances in the legislative process. Brokering a 
tough compromise, making a speech or engaging behind-the-scenes wrangling to encourage 
affirmative votes, and exercising power at one of the many veto points to stop a piece of legislation 
that a legislator opposes are not captured in the dataset. Furthermore, conceptually, it seems that 
conservatives who favor small government may be less likely to propose new legislation and more 
likely to try to block legislation that expands the government, activities that would result in a lower 
LES score. Such a hypothesis would require additional analysis beyond the scope of this paper. 
Nevertheless, LES provides a window into the effectiveness of legislators in lawmaking, which 
makes it useful for this paper. 
Variable Measurements 
LES is measured on an additive scale that is normalized in each Congress such that the 
average is 1 for that Congress (Volden and Wiseman 2011, 245). For introducing a bill that achieves 
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any of five criteria – being introduced to the House, receiving action in committee, pass committee 
and receive action on the House floor, pass the House, and become law – a legislator receives an 
addition to his or her score, and the total additive score at the end of the Congress represents that 
member’s LES. To account for the lesser impact of naming a post office than adopting a budget, the 
score also divides bills into one of three categories: commemorative, substantive, and substantive & 
significant. Bills that received year-end write-ups in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac were 
deemed substantively significant, bills that provided for the renaming, commemoration, or 
celebration of a person or event were deemed commemorative, and all other bills were deemed 
substantive; the bills were thus weighed accordingly. The highest recorded value in the original 
dataset is Charlie Rangel, who scored 18.69 in the 100th Congress while serving as Chair of the 
House Committee on Ways and Means (Volden and Wiseman 2011, 242-46). Table 1, reproduced 
from Volden and Wiseman (2011) shows the average impact of various activities on an LES score 
through the 110th Congress (the original data go through the 110th Congress; subsequently, three 
additional Congresses have been appended). 
Table 1: Average Impact of Legislative Process Stages on Legislative Effectiveness (93rd to 110th Congresses) 
 Commemorative Substantive Substantive & Significant 
Introductions 0.0023 0.0116 0.0231 
Action in Committee 0.0146 0.0732 0.1464 
Actions beyond Committee 0.0181 0.0904 0.1808 
Passed House 0.0223 0.1116 0.2232 
Becomes Law 0.0457 0.2285 0.4570 
Source: Volden and Wiseman (2011), 247 
 
 To measure ideology, I use the DW-NOMINATE measure developed by Poole and 
Rosenthal (1985), which places members on a scale of -1, which represents, most liberal, to 1, which 
represents most conservative; the theoretical center – and my area of interest – is near 0. For the 
purposes of generating descriptive statistics, I recoded DW-NOMINATE into a five-category ordinal 
measure, each of which represents an equal interval of theoretical ideological space within the index. 
As such, -1 to -0.6 represents extremely liberal, -0.6 to -0.2 represents liberal, -0.2 to 0.2 represents 
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moderate, 0.2 to 0.6 represents conservative, and 0.6 to 1 represents extremely conservative. Using 
this conceptualization, the underlying premise of the literature on centrism – namely the argument 
of Thomsen (2017) – as well as the theoretical foundation for this paper – that centrists are declining 
in number as Congress, and specifically the Republican party, moves to the right – is resoundingly 
confirmed in Table 2. 
Table 2: Ideological Composition of Congress Before and After 1994 
Ideology using  
DW-NOMINATE 
Year at Start of Congress  
Before 1994 1994 and After Total 
Extreme Liberal 158 169 327 
Liberal 1970 1748 3718 
Moderate 1263 294 1557 
Conservative 1336 1357 2693 
Extreme Conservative 80 816 896 
Total 4807 4384 9191 
Source: DW-NOMINATE score (Poole and Rosenthal 1985) recoded to five categories, each 
representing the same theoretical ideological space 
 
 Table 3 shows the mean legislative effectiveness for each group over the entire span of the 
data (1971-2014) (a graphical representation of which is shown in Figure 1), and Table 4 splits the 
timeframe almost in half – before 1994 and since 1994 – to begin probing the notion that moderates 
may have become less effective in the Gingrich era and beyond. 
Table 3: Legislative Effectiveness by Ideological Group  
Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Extreme Liberal 1.162158 .0819513 1.001516 1.322801 
Liberal 1.104687 .02873 1.04837 1.161004 
Moderate .8475347 .0346334 .7796454 .9154239 
Conservative .9198844 .0280676 .8648657 .9749031 
Extreme Conservative 1.025621 .0532819 .9211766 1.130065 
Source: LES and DW-NOMINATE recoded to five categories, each representing 
the same theoretical ideological space 
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Figure 1: LES, by Ideology
Table 4: Legislative Effectiveness by Ideological Group Before and After 1994  
Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Extreme Liberal Pre-1994 1.402041 .1127945 1.180939 1.623143 
Extreme Liberal Since 1994 .9378895 .1161077 .7102927 1.165486 
Liberal Pre-1994 1.543917 .047705 1.450405 1.63743 
Liberal Since 1994 .6096734 .0240827 .5624659 .6568809 
Moderate Pre-1994 .8234099 .0379739 .7489726 .8978472 
Moderate Since 1994 .951173 .0837098 .7870832 1.115263 
Conservative Pre-1994 .3752659 .0128106 .3501542 .4003775 
Conservative Since 1994 1.456075 .0501725 1.357726 1.554424 
Extreme Conservative Pre-1994 .3431658 .03487 .2748129 .4115187 
Extreme Conservative Since 1994 1.092528 .057881 .9790687 1.205988 
*Source: LES Data (Volden and Wiseman) and Poole’s DW-NOMINATE score 
recoded to five categories, each representing the same theoretical ideological 
space 
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 Noting the high overlap in confidence intervals and cognizant of the breadth of endogenous 
factors that may affect legislative effectiveness, I added several control variables to isolate the affect 
of ideology on LES. 
Model Estimation 
 Because both the independent and dependent variable are interval level measurements, I used 
OLS regression to approximate the expected values for LES under a variety of conditions and 
controls. I ran two separate interactions and thus two separate models to analyze the effectiveness of 
legislators by ideology before and after 1994 as well as the effectiveness of legislators by ideology 
based on their seniority, cognizant that seniority is clearly suggestive of one’s likelihood to hold key 
committee assignments and chairmanships as well as one’s general influence.  
 In the first model, which interacted ideology and seniority, I controlled for majority status, 
chairmanship of a committee or subcommittee, party affiliation, and gender. Each of the control 
variables is a nominal level of measurement represented by a dummy variable, so I held each at their 
respective modal values (1 for majority status and party affiliation (Democrat=1), 0 for all others 
(Female=1)). 
 In the second model, which interacted ideology and whether the term in question was before 
1994 or since 1994, I controlled for seniority, majority status, chairmanship of a committee or 
subcommittee, party affiliation, and gender. Seniority, an interval level measure wherein a score of 
1 indicates a member is in his or her first term of service, 2 indicates second, and so forth, was held 
at its mean value, while all other control variables, as in the first model, were held at their modal 
values as indicated. 
Results 
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Model 1: Interaction of Ideology and Seniority 
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Figure 3: Legislative Effectiveness by Seniority & Ideology
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 (1) 
VARIABLES les 
  
dwnom1 -0.271*** 
 (0.0760) 
seniority 0.0579*** 
 (0.00363) 
seniorconservative 0.00691 
 (0.00720) 
majority 0.496*** 
 (0.0323) 
chair 3.183*** 
 (0.0639) 
subchr 0.818*** 
 (0.0357) 
dem -0.336*** 
 (0.0582) 
female 0.0586 
 (0.0431) 
Constant 0.234*** 
 (0.0388) 
Observations 9,194 
R-squared 0.422 
 
 This model gives strong support to the value of seniority in determining legislative 
effectiveness, but, as indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals for moderates and liberals 
among junior and senior members and overlapping of confidence intervals for all three ideological 
groups, provides no evidence to reject the null hypothesis, that moderates and non-moderates are 
indistinguishable with respect to legislative effectiveness. The regression coefficients confirm 
Volden and Wiseman’s findings (2011) that committee and subcommittee chairmanship as well as 
status in the majority are among the best predictors of legislative effectiveness. Seniority and party 
affiliation bore lesser – yet still statistically significant – regression coefficients. This analysis 
produced no statistically significant findings with respect to the effect of gender on legislative 
effectiveness. In sum, this model provides no evidence to support the hypothesis that centrists are 
less effective than non-centrists in passing legislation. 
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Model 2: Interaction of Ideology and Term of Service 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES les 
  
dwnom1 -0.315*** 
 (0.0862) 
since1994 0.0890*** 
 (0.0265) 
dwnomsince1994 0.0548 
 (0.0886) 
seniority 0.0560*** 
 (0.00362) 
majority 0.485*** 
 (0.0415) 
chair 3.185*** 
 (0.0639) 
subchr 0.826*** 
 (0.0358) 
dem -0.358*** 
 (0.0589) 
female 0.0321 
 (0.0439) 
Constant 0.217*** 
 (0.0405) 
  
Observations 9,194 
R-squared 0.422 
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Figure 4: Legislative Effectiveness by Ideology & Year of Service
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 This model provides no evidence to reject its corresponding null hypothesis, that, since 1994, 
moderates have grown less effective as legislators in the post-Gingrich era. In fact, for none of the 
three ideological groups has the expected value for legislative effectiveness changed at a statistically 
significant level within this time gradation. Notably, however, pre-1994 conservatives appear less 
effective than post-1994 moderates and post-1994 liberals. Prior to 1994, Democrats held a majority 
in the House of Representatives, a majority that Republicans seized in 1994 and held through 2006 
and again after the 2010 midterm elections. This finding may suggest that Democrats are more 
effective at legislating from the minority or that, as noted above with respect to the theoretical 
constraint of the LES model, that conservatives are inherently less apt to advance legislation and 
thus – in the construction of this model – engage in “effective lawmaking.” And, as with the previous 
model, the regression coefficients remain largely the same or very similar, and the same control 
variables that indicated statistical significance previously indicate it once again. In sum, this model 
provides no evidence to support the hypothesis that centrists have become less effective in the post-
Gingrich era, and, furthermore, it provides no evidence that centrists are less effective than 
conservatives or liberals as lawmakers. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in either case. As such, the data – at least in the 
permutations examined – does not support the theoretical argument I made that, as centrists have 
declined in number (which is established by the data), they have decreased in effectiveness. This is 
an interesting finding particularly with respect to the work of Thomsen (2017), who shows 
compellingly that, as moderates exhibit declining values of “party fit” (ideological adherence to their 
party), they are more apt to be defeated or, more likely, to retire. To some extent, this may suggest 
that those legislators who remain in Congress are those who are more effective, which may help to 
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explain the relative consistency of moderates’ LES score across time despite their decreasing 
numbers. Similarly, those moderates who do decide to stay and continue to get re-elected establish 
the seniority that helps all legislators be more effective. Further research could help confirm or 
disprove those hypotheses. 
 What is clear is that moderates have declined precipitously in number, yet, at the same time, 
their effectiveness has not decreased correspondingly. Future research should analyze the 
effectiveness of moderates within narrower time windows – such as the periods of House 
speakerships – as well as longitudinal data showing the effectiveness of moderates over time to drill 
deeper into the question of under what conditions moderates are more effective legislators. Such 
research could also help voters – who exhibit profound antipathy towards the overall ineffectiveness 
of Congress – know which types of legislators are more apt to get things done. Until then, the current 
gridlock may well continue. 
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